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THE EFFECT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ON ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
RICHARD

C.

AUSNESS*

The King moreover is not only incapable of doing wrong, but
even of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper
thing: in him is no folly or weakness.'
INTRODUCTION

The ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to flourish in
the rule that the federal government may not be sued by name without
its consent.! Since governmental immunity in the United States affects
the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts," it cannot be waived by
federal officials; only express congressional authorization will suffice."
There have been numerous legislative waivers of sovereign immunity,'
and most judicial review of federal administrative activity now proceeds
under some statutory review procedure.' However, some governmental
functions, especially those committed to one of the older executive departments, remain insulated from direct review by the courts.7 Thus, the
immunity doctrine survives despite its universal condemnation as an
unwarranted impediment to the judicial review of improper administrative conduct.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida.

1.

1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 245 (S. Tucker

ed. 1803).
2. State sovereign immunity will not be discussed in this article. However, it occasionally figures in environmental litigation. See Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F.
Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939) ; Case v. Terrell, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 199 (1870).
4. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
5. E.g., Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970); Court of Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1491 (1970); Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
6. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for
Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties De-

fendant, 68 MICH. L. Rv. 389, 394 (1970)
7.
8.

[hereinafter cited as Cramton].

Id.
Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Non-statutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign

Immunity, Indispensible Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1479 (1962)
cited as Byse] ; Cramton 419.

[hereinafter
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Sovereign immunity, however, has never entirely precluded suits
by persons harmed by official actions. Injunctive relief, along with the
declaratory judgment suit,' has long provided a means of contesting
administrative decisions in a nonstatutory review action against the
officer who authorized or performed the act. The so-called officer suit
proceeded on the theory that one who committed a wrongful act was
answerable in tort for his conduct.1"
The emergence of the environmental protection suit is one of the
most significant legal developments of the past decade. 1 ' Recent legislation enacted in response to the growing public desire for conservation and
protection of the environment has entrusted broad powers to federal
agencies to further these objectives. 2 At the same time, federal courts
have demonstrated an increased willingness to allow private individuals
and conservationist groups to challenge the failure of governmental
agencies to discharge their recently acquired environmental responsibilities." In these cases, the primary emphasis has been placed on the
question of standing to sue, but as this problem approaches final resolution,' 4 sovereign immunity may replace it as the major impediment to
review of administrative action in this crucial area.
A number of excellent articles have been published on the general
subject of federal sovereign immunity in recent years, 5 but most of them
9. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). See Cramton 394.
10. See generally Comment, Immunity of Government Officers: Effects of the Larson Case, 8 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1956).
11. For a discussion of the environmental protection suit see LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970); J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT:
STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971) ; Lynch & Stevens, Environmental Law-The Uncertain Trumpet, 5 U. SAN FRANCIsco L. REV. 10 (1970) ; Comment, The Environmental
Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE
L. REv. 1085 (1970).
12. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970)
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 et seq. (1970) ; Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1131 et seq. (1970); Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§
4601-4 to -11 (1970) ; Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1970) ;
Estuarine Areas Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-26 (1970) ; Water Resources Planning
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 et seq. (1970) ; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970) ;
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1970) ; Oil Pollution Act, 1961, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1970).

13. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 3S4
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) ; Citizens Connittee for the
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Road Review League v.

Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

See also Association of Data Processing

Services Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) ; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970) ; Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontationwith the Problems
of Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1070 (1970).
14. But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
15. Byse 8; Cramton 6; Davis, Siing the Government by Falseby Pretending to Sue
an Officer, 29 U. CHi. L. REV. 435 (1962) ; Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Offi-
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have been substantially concerned with legislative or judicial reform of
this and related doctrines. The growing importance of environmental
values as significant social and legal interests compels an examination
of the relationship between sovereign immunity and the environmental
protection suit. This article will trace the past and recent development
of the immunity doctrine and consider its present and potential impact on
environmental litigation.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF TRE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

The actual origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity are far
from certain.' 8 The former belief that it stemed from Roman law has
now been discredited. 7 The earliest evidence of the doctrine in England
dates from the reign of Henry III; 8 Bracton stated in the thirteenth
century that the king could not be sued in royal court without his consent,'" and a decision in 1234 asserted the immunity of the sovereign."0
It would seem that the doctrine of sovereign immunity during the middle
ages was associated with the royal person of the king. Although the
immunity was personal in nature,2 ' the theoretical basis for the doctrine
is less clear. Blackstone ascribed the maxim that "the King could do no
wrong" to the royal prerogative, "that special preeminence which the
King hath over and above all other persons, and out of the course of the
common law, in right of his royal dignity."2 Although the maxim
"the King can do no wrong" is often cited as the basis of sovereign
immunity, the belief that the king was above the law was not widely held
during the period in which the doctrine first developed.23 Sovereign
immunity may have had nothing to do with the royal prerogative, but
rather, proceeded from the medieval notion that no man could be sued in
cers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1963) ; Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and
Non Statutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the
Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867 (1970).
16. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L.

REv. 476, 477 (1953).
17. Id.
18. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REv. 141,
142 (1922).
19. 1 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 516 (2d ed.
1968).
20. Id. at 516 n. 7. Not only was the king immune from suit as a party defendant
in the first instance, but he could not be impleaded in a suit between subjects, as for example under voucher or warranty. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 143-45.
21. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924).
22.

2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 239 (S. Tucker

ed. 1803).
23. See Blachly & Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 181, 182 (1942).
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his own court: "He [the king] can not be compelled to answer in his
own court, but this is true of every petty lord of every petty manor; that
there happens to be in this world no court above his is, we may say, an
accident."2 4 Whatever its origin, the personal immunity of the king from
suit was gradually transformed during the Tudor period into the modem
theory of governmental immunity.2
Remedies such as the petition of right, the traverse of facts and the
montrans de droit gradually evolved during the late middle ages.26
However, none of these remedies provided relief from tortious conduct
by administrative personnel,2 and royal consent was required before suit
could be brought against them.28 Acts of the king's agents were considered to be acts of the king, thereby requiring complaints against these
agents to be made to the king himself or those delegated by the king to
hear such complaints. Even when the king did assume responsibility, the
subject's only redress was through a petition to the king.2" Suits against
officers without royal permission were gradually allowed during the reign
of Edward I and his immediate successors,8" although obedience to a
royal command was still considered to provide full justification for an
otherwise unlawful act. 1 By this time, however, waiver by the king of
his sovereign immunity enabled the plaintiff to bring suit against the
officer in a common law court.2 Finally, it was recognized by the
fifteenth century that if a royal officer engaged in wrongful conduct, he
alone would be liable. 8 By the late seventeenth century, even the defense
of obedience to royal command failed to provide protection to officials
since the fiction had developed that the king would not authorize an
illegal act.3
24. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 518.
25. Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 HARv.L. Rav. 447 (1919);
Pugh, supra note 16, at 478.
26. The petition of right permitted the subject to institute, with royal permission, a
legal action against the king where the litigant's claim would be valid but for the royal
status of the defendant. This procedure, however, was often quite lengthy and Parliament in 1360 enacted a statute which allowed litigants in special cases to traverse findings of fact by royal officials. The scope of the traverse of fact was greatly expanded
by legislation in 1362, and this eventually led to the remedy of monstrans de droit. Holdsworth, supra note 18.
27. Pugh, supra note 16, at 479.
28. H. BRACrON, Dz LEGIBUS ET CONSUBTUDINIBUs ANGLIAE, 171b, 172 a (T.Twiss
ed. 1878).
29. Blachly & Oatman, supra note 23, at 185.
30. Holdsworth, supra note 23, at 185.
31. Blachly & Oatman, supra note 23, at 185.

32. Id.
33. E.g., Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1 (1275) ; Statute of Westminster II,
13 Edw. 1 (1285).
34.

See Sand v. Child, 83 Eng. Rep. 725 (K.B. 1693).
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Despite its seeming inconsistency with the principles of democratic
government," the doctrine of sovereign immunity was quickly accepted
in the United States. Perhaps the principal reason for the adoption of the
immunity doctrine in America was an eminently practical one. Many
states had incurred substantial debts during the Revolutionary War, and
sovereign immunity appealed to the states as a means of avoiding the
embarrassment of being sued by creditors."8 Indeed, such prominent
figures as Hamilton,"' 'Madison" and Marshall 9 endorsed the doctrine
in their efforts to secure ratification of the Constitution." The concept
of sovereign immunity developed slowly in the federal courts during the
nineteenth century.41 Cases involving the issue occurred infrequently
before 1875 because federal courts were not given general jurisdiction
over federal questions until then.42 Congress in 1855 enacted the first
general provision for the recovery of damages against the federal government by creating the Court of Claims with jurisdiction over actions
arising out of government contracts. 8
As in England, the officer suit developed as a means of circumventing the bar to direct suits against the government." Under this approach,
the plaintiff could institute legal actions against an administrative officer,
alleging that the defendant had interfered with a legal right. If the officer
could show that he had acted pursuant to valid statutory authority, the
defense of sovereign immunity would be effective and the court would be
compelled to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 5
The defense of sovereign immunity, however, was subject to various
exceptions; it was not available as a defense to actions by the officer
which exceeded the scope of his authority,' actions brought under an
35. Laski, supra note 25, at 464-66.
36. Pugh, supra note 16, at 481.
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
38. 3 3. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (1836).
39. Id. at 555-56.
40. However, soon afterwards the Supreme Court limited state sovereign immunity
in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 16 (1793). The eleventh amendment was the
immediate response to the Court's action. Although it did not prohibit suits against the
federal government, it indirectly influenced the development of the immunity doctrine in

subsequent federal decisions. Pugh, supra note 16, at 485.
41. See United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 151 (1834) ; United States v.
McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 117 (1846) ; Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.)

10 (1846) ; Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 189 (1850).
42. Cramton 396.
43. 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
44.

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

45.
46.

E.g., Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918).
E.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606

(1918) ; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
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unconstitutional statute" or involving an unconstitutional taking,' and
the doctrine did not apply to actions which, unless justified, would have
constituted a common law tort. 9 Tortious conduct which involved an
erroneous exercise of authority was presumed to be unauthorized unless
the action was committed to the discretion of the officer by statute. " If
the plaintiff based his suit on one of the factors mentioned above, the
court would not dismiss the action without considering the nature of the
officer's authority. Since valid immunity would deprive the court of
jurisdiction, this approach meant that the question of jurisdiction and the
merits of the case itself rested upon the same considerations."1 In practice,
the court would make a preliminary determination of jurisdiction on the
pleadings5 2 followed by a hearing on the merits unless it appeared that
"the actions alleged could not be said to be in excess of the statutory
authority pleaded by the defendants .

. .

.

Through the legal fiction of treating a government official as a
private individual, the courts were able to exercise some powers of review
over the actions of the executive departments of government." Even
where the allegedly wrongful act fit into one of the above three categories,
jurisdiction would be denied when the relief sought was of certain kinds:
1) the courts would not enforce specific performance of contracts against
the government;" 2) the courts would not direct government officials to
pay over public funds;"5 3) the courts normally would not direct officials
47. E.g., Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936) ; Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
48. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196

(1882).
49.

8

See Comment, Imnnunity of Government Officers: Effects of the Larson Case,

683, 684-85 (1956).
50. See, e.g., Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1966).

STAN. L. REv.

official's discretion is subject to judicial interpretation.

But the extent of the

Universal Camera Corp. v.

N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
51. Federal Administrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DUKE L.J. 67, 204
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Law Developments].
52. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) ; West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213
F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
53. Comment, supra note 49, at 686.
54. Byse 1485. In theory the government was not bound by an adverse judgment
against the officer. For a discussion of the res judicata effects against the United
States when a government counsel defends the action see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 27.06 at 576 (1958).
55. Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918) ; United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels,
231 U.S. 218 (1913) ; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886) ; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711 (1882).
56. E.g., Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945) ; Morrison
v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925) ; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896). But see Roberts
v. United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900) ; Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of
Internal Revenue, 60 HARV. L. REv. 685 (1947).
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to give over property the title to which was unquestionably in the federal
or state government.5 7
PRESENT IMMUNITY RULES

The modern doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States
emerged from the decision in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp." In this case, the plaintiff, charging that the War Assets Administration had sold him certain surplus coal and then refused to deliver it,
brought suit to enjoin the sale or delivery of the coal to any other person.
The controversy concerned the terms of the contract regarding the
manner of payment. The plaintiff maintained that the contract did not
require payment prior to delivery, while the government demanded
full payment before transfer of possession. When the plaintiff tendered
an unsatisfactory letter of credit instead of a cash deposit, the War
Assets Administrator treated this as a breach of the contract and refused to make delivery.
The circuit court had held that jurisdiction depended upon whether
title to the coal had passed from the government to the plaintiff. " The
Supreme Court, however, declined to consider the question of title and
held that the suit was barred regardless of which party actually had title
to the coal." ° The Court instead addressed itself to the issue of whether
erroneous or tortious conduct by the government officer was ipso facto
beyond the scope of his statutory authority. The plaintiff, relying on
existing case law, asserted that such conduct could never be within the
scope of the officer's authority and thus was outside the protection of
sovereign immunity."' The Court rejected this position and distinguished
between the type of wrongful act required to state a cause of action and
that which was beyond the scope of the officer's authority:
It is argued that an officer given the power to make decisions is
only given the power to make correct decisions. If his decisions
are not correct, then his action based on those decisions is
beyond his authority and not the action of the sovereign. There
57. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939); Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908) ; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906). But see Wilbur v.
United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930) ; Santa Fe Pac. R.R. v. Fall, 259
U.S. 197 (1922); West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
58. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
59. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. v. Littlejohn, 165 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir.

1947).
60. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
61. Id. at 692.
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is no warrant for such a contention in cases in which the decision made by the officer does not relate to the terms of his
statutory authority. Certainly the jurisdiction of a court to
decide a case does not disappear if its decision on the merits is
wrong. And we have heretofore rejected the argument that
official action is invalid if based on an incorrect decision as to
law or fact, if the officer making the decision was empowered to
do so. We therefore reject the contention here. We hold that if
the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms of his
valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law, if they
would be regarded as the actions of a private principal under the
normal rules of agency. A Government officer is not thereby
necessarily immunized from liability, if his action is such that
a liability would be imposed by the general law of torts. But
the action itself cannot be enjoined or directed, since it is also
the action of the sovereign.8 2
In the course of the opinion, the majority reviewed the leading cases
in support of the parties' respective positions. Goltra v. Weeks,"3 which
was a suit to enjoin a federal officer from attempting to repossess barges
leased to the plaintiff by the government, held that such repossession by
the government would constitute a trespass and was thus beyond the
officer's statutory authority. The Larson court, however, refused to
follow the Goltra decision and instead accepted the contrary position
exemplified by United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels." The plaintiff
in Goldberg had submitted the winning bid on a surplus war vessel, but
the Secretary of the Navy refused to complete the sale and deliver the
vessel. The Court invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
declared that the plaintiff's suit must fail even if title had actually passed.
It may be argued that the result in the Larson case was in accord
with prior decisions. In Goltra, the plaintiff was already in possession of
the barges under a leasehold interest. His rights could be secured by
simply prohibiting the officer from acting to repossess. On the other hand,
in both Goldberg and Larson possession had not left the government.
Therefore, to require the officer to take the affirmative step of delivering the property to the plaintiff would have amounted to specific performance against the government.
62. Id. at 695 (citation omitted).
63. 271 U.S. 536 (1926).
64. 231 U.S. 218 (1913).
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The Court's doctrinal justification for this result, however, is open
to serious question. Instead of simply holding that specific performance
against the government was an impermissible form of relief, the Court
enunciated the troublesome rule that erroneous or tortious conduct by
an officer would no longer always be considered outside the scope of his
authority. 5 The Larson decision also suggested that relief might be
denied even though the officer's conduct fell within one of the exceptions
"if the relief requested can not be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by
the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property."" This principle, set forth in the celebrated footnote eleven of the
Court's opinion, has contributed its share to the confusion surrounding
sovereign immunity.6"
Turner v. Kings River Conservation District" interpreted the
language of footnote eleven as being discretionary rather than mandatory since it stated that a suit "may" rather than "must" fail when certain forms of relief are requested. Turner was an action by owners of
riparian and overlying lands against officials operating the Pine Flat
Dam and reservoir on Kings River in California to prevent interference
with their water supply. The court held that footnote eleven did not control the decision because the plaintiffs would have an adequate remedy by
restraining governmental intereference with their water rights without
requiring a disposition of government property.69 In the later case of
Washington v. Udall70 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position rejecting footnote eleven.
One recent case, however, seems to have taken a contrary view. In
65. The Larson decision raised an additional question by apparently associating
sovereign immunity with the law of agency. 337 U.S. at 695. Fortunately, this aspect
of the case has not been favorably received. But see Hudspeth County Conservation &
Reclamation Dist. No. 1 v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
833 (1954).
66. 337 U.S. at 691 n.11.
67. See Cramton 414-15. Footnote eleven of Larson first attracted notice in West
Coast Exploration Co. lo. McKay where the court stated:
[W]e think that the holding of the Larson case . . . recognizing the two

jurisdictional exceptions is not modified or lessened in force by the footnote
referred to, and that it does not preclude the application of the exceptions to
cases in which Government property is involved.
213 F.2d 582, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
68. 360 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1966).
69. Id. at 189 (citation omitted). The court, however, did determine that the
Flood Control Act of 1944, under which the project was operated, permitted the interference with plaintiff's water rights. As a result, the plaintiff was limited to an action
for damages.
70. Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Administrative
Law Developments, supra note 51, at 215-16.
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Zapata v. Smith,7 1 members of VISTA brought suit against the Governor
of Texas and the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity
alleging that they had been illegally removed from participation in a
VISTA project. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the officers' actions and also requested damages for back pay. The
court reviewed the general test of immunity and the scope of authority
doctrine, but then stated:
At first glance our case would appear to come within this
exception [ultra vires acts] since the plaintiffs have pled that
the dismissal of the VISTA volunteers was both unauthorized
by statute, or, if authorized, was an unconstitutional deprivation
of due process. However, there is a well recognized exception
to the exception which applies to this case and which makes it
clear that, despite the statutory and constitutional allegations
of the plaintiffs, the suit is nevertheless one against the United
States."2
Quoting from footnote eleven of Larson, the court held that affirmative
action would be required for the government to pay back wages. Since
this made the government an indispensable party to the action, the suit
could not be maintained without its consent. It is noteworthy that the
court gave footnote eleven mandatory effect without referring to those
cases which had held it to be nonmandatory.
Although Larson has been universally criticized,"' the Supreme
Court has steadfastly refused to retreat from its position and has further
developed it in later cases. In Malone v. Bowdoin7 4 the plaintiff had
filed a common law ejectment action against a federal Forest Service
officer, claiming title to property in the possession of the government."
The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by the Government's
immunity and indicated that United States v. Lee" had little validity
after the Larson decision. The Lee case had held that governmental
officers who trespassed upon the plaintiff's land could be sued for specific
relief. While some cases subsequent to Lee had suggested limitations on
71. 437 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1971).
72. Id. at 1025.
73. See, e.g., K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE

§ 27.05 (1958); GELLHORN
(4th ed. 1960) ; Byse 148591; Cramton 404-11; Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REv. 401, 433-37

& BYSE,

LAW TREATISE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 354-55

(1958).
74. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).

75. See 17
76.

RUTGERS

L. REv. 475, 467 n.1 (1963).

106 U.S. 196 (1882).
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the "tortious act" theory,77 it had uniformly been held that sovereign
immunity did not automatically bar an action to recover real property
where it was alleged that title was in the plaintiff." In addition, numerous suits involving disputes over federal land grants to the states or to
the railroads had been allowed against the federal government without
recourse to the immunity doctrine."' The plaintiff's position in Malone
greatly resembled that of the dissenting justices in Larson who had
asserted that sovereign immunity should not impair a person's right
under general law to regain possession of wrongfully withheld property."
Under this view, the defense of sovereign immunity would be available
to the government only after a court had determined that ownership of
the property was not vested in the plaintiff.
The court in Malone, however, reaffirmed the Larson holding and
determined that the officer had not exceeded his statutory authority when
he wrongfully and tortiously withheld the plaintiff's land. Consequently,
the only question for decision was whether or not there had been an
unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's property without compensation.
It was decided that Lee was no longer controlling in this respect since
Congress now provided a remedy in the Court of Claims."
In Dugan v. Rank,"2 the Supreme Court held that the immunity
doctrine would bar an action by riparian owners to prevent officials of the
Bureau of Reclamation from impounding water at a federal dam on the
San Joaquin River as part of the Central Valley Project.8 The Supreme
Court drafted a general test to determine if a suit was one against the
government by declaring that sovereign immunity would normally bar
an action if "'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public
treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the
effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting,
or to compel it to act.' "84 In Dugan, a grant of injunctive relief to the
plaintiff would clearly have resulted in termination or modification of a
large-scale, congressionally authorized federal project . Although the
77. United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913).
78. The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 220-22 (1962).
79. E.g., Payne v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228 (1921) ; Noble v. Union River
Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). See also 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 258 (1950).
80. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 717 (1949) (dissenting opinion) quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736 (1946).

81. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1962) ; 17
82. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).

RUTGERS

L. REv. 475 (1963).

83. For a discussion of the project see Graham, The Central Valley Project: Resource Development of a Natural Basin, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 588 (1950).
84. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (citation omitted) quoting sith approval Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) and Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
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Court appeared to base its decision solely on the general test of immunity
enunciated above without placing much emphasis on the unconstitutional
and ultra vires exceptions, it would seem that neither was relevant since a
method of compensation had been provided by Congress. 5
8 also involved
Hawaii v. Gordon"
an application of the general test
of sovereign immunity. In this case, the state brought suit to require the
Director of the Budget to withdraw his advice to federal agencies that
lands in Hawaii obtained by the United States through purchase, condemnation or gift were not lands to be conveyed to Hawaii by virtue of
the statehood act. 7 The Court denied the requested relief since "the order
requested would require the Director's official affirmative action, affect
the public administration of government agencies and cause as well the
disposition of property admittedly belonging to the United States."88
From these cases it can be seen that an action against a government
officer will be barred by sovereign immunity if: 1) the decree would
operate against the sovereign, 2) the judgment would expend itself upon
the public treasury or domain or 3) the judgment would restrain the
government from acting or compel it to act." Even if the immunity rule
would not bar an action under one of these general rules, the Larson
decision had established that a suit against a government officer would
nevertheless be barred if the officer was properly exercising the discretion afforded him under the appropriate statute. The limits of an
official's statutory discretion, however, remained subject to various
judicial interpretations. 0
ERROR IN

THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY-APPROACHES

TO STATUTORY

DISCRETION

One of the salient features of the Larson decision was the rule that
tortious or erroneous actions by a government officer would not neces85.
The Court also rejected the argument that the McCarren Act, 43 U.S.C. §
666 (1970), constituted a waiver of immunity. 372 U.S. at 617.
86. 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
87. Hawaii Statehood Bill, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
88. 373 U.S. at 58.
89. See Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609,
620 (1963) ; Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1962); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731, 738 (1947).
90. Another matter which has continued to perplex the courts is whether the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970), should be construed as a waiver
of sovereign immunity. Many courts have held that the A.P.A. has not waived governmental immunity. E.g., Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515-16 (1952); Motah v.
United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968); Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918
(10th Cir. 1964). But see Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966),
aff'd 387 U.S. 158 (1967) ; Cappadora v. Celebreeze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Estrada
v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Adams v. Witner, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958).
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sarily be construed as being beyond the scope of his authority. Although
this position was almost immediately accepted by the lower federal
courts," Larson's treatment of the scope of authority doctrine has
received a variety of interpretations. Such differences have primarily
centered around the method of examining the officer's statutory discretion.
General Statutory Authority
The Larson opinion implied that only those actions which directly
conflicted with an officer's general authority were within the ultra vires
exception." This language has led some courts to conclude that an officer
need have only general authority to do the sort of act in question in order
to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 3 This result may be
reached even where the statute upon which the parties rely contains no
explicit authorization for erroneous decisions. Such an approach, however,
frequently enables courts to avoid the difficult task of interpreting
statutes to determine the limits of administrative discretion.
It is perfectly possible for a court to hold that an official has
authority to make erroneous as well as correct determinations.
Such a holding, of course, should rest on a reasoned determination that Congress intended to confer so broad a discretion.
But under Larson, Doehla, et al., the courts seem to interpret
the statutes cursorily to authorize the defendant official to
act in the "general" area in question; so long as the official
remains within the "general" area, his erroneous acts are
unreviewable whether or not the statute properly construed
was intended to confer such an unreviewable discretion. This
. . . is an abdication of judicial responsibility.9"
Illustrative of this general authority approach is Doehla Greeting
91. Arizona ex rel. Arizona State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498
(D.C. Cir. 1954). See also Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
aff'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 605 (1964) ; Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Wohl Shoe Co. v. Wirtz, 246 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.
Mo. 1965).
92. "We hold that if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms of his
valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign, whether or not they
are tortious under general law ....
" Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,

337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949).
93. Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
934 (1970); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 407 F.2d 916 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 826 (1969) ; Simms v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.
1968) ; Colter Corp. v. Seaborg, 370 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Doehla Greeting Cards,
Inc. v. Surnmerfield, 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
94. Byse 1491.
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Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield,9" where the plaintiff attemped to enjoin the
Postmaster General from enforcing new postal rates with respect to
certain fourth class mail." The statute upon which the parties relied
empowered the Postmaster General, based upon his experience, to reform
postage rates if he found the costs of operation to be greater than the
receipts. The court concluded that even if the officer had not made
such a finding before raising the rates, his action was only erroneous
and therefore within the scope of his authority. There was, of course,
nothing in the statute referring to erroneous decisions; the court merely
assumed that this authority was implied in the official's general authority
to establish rates.
The general authority approach was also followed in Gardner v.
Harris." This action was brought against the superintendent of the
Natchez Trace Parkway to compel him to remove barricades which
blocked the plaintiff's access to the highway. 9 After discussing the scope
00
of authority rule, the court declared that, under the applicable statute,
the Superintendent was charged with the responsibility, as an
agent of the Secretary of the Interior, of administering and
maintaining the Natchez Trace. No limits on his authority
are cited to us, either by the Goverment or by the Court below,
as long as it is reasonably connected with the administration
of the Trace.''
In effect, the absence in the statute of any express limitation on the
officer's discretion virtually precluded judicial inquiry into the limits of
the discretion itself or the validity of the particular act in question.
In Gnotta v. United States,' the defense of sovereign immunity
was accepted by the court with little examination of the officer's discretionary authority. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied a promotion
despite more than eleven years service with the U.S. Army Corps of
95. 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also Comment, Immunity of Government Of-

ficers: Effects of the Larson Case, 8

STAN.

L. REv. 683 (1956).

96. The district court had dismissed the complaint because plaintiff failed to name
an indespensable party. Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68

(D.D.C. 1953).
97. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, § 207, 43 Stat. 1067; Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc.
v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 44, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
98. 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968).
99. The lower court had found that the defendant had exceeded his authority. Id. at

887.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 460 (1970).
101.

391 F.2d at 888 (footnote omitted).

102. 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
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Engineers because of discrimination on the basis of his Italian ancestry."' 8

Upholding the lower court's dismissal, the circuit court applied the
Larson criteria in determining that the action was one against the
sovereign. There was no real consideration of the allegations of ultra
vires conduct; instead, the court summarily concluded that "[tihis
obviously is not a case which concerns either of the exceptions recognized
in Dugan v. Rank ....

""' While the court may have assumed that the

internal operation of the agency was properly within the exclusive discretion of the supervisory personnel, the plaintiff had raised issues that
arguably placed him within the exception to the immunity rule. Discrimination on the basis of race, creed or national origin was expressly
prohibited." 5 The court itself admitted "that Executive Orders such as
Nos. 11246 and 10925 are to be accorded the force and effect of an act of
Congress."' 6 While the court may have been correct in assuming that
the executive order itself did not support a cause of action,' 7 it failed to
consider that the order placed the officials' conduct outside the scope of
their authority. Surely, the court did not believe that Congress had given
officials within the agency the power to discriminate on the basis of
national origin.'0 8
Perhaps the court was reluctant to interfere with internal affairs of
the agency and to substitute its judgment for that of the officials who
had evaluated Gnotta's performance. However, a possible solution would
have been to decide that Gnotta had simply failed to prove his allegations.
This would have been preferable to a decision based on sovereign
immunity. There is language in the opinion to suggest that such a conclusion might reasonably have been reached." 9
103. See Note, The Scope of Judicial Review Afforded a Civil Service Employee's
Discharge, 3 HARV. LEGAL COMMENTARY 12 (1966).
104. Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir. 1969) (citation omitted) ; see note 84 supra and accompanying text.
105. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1965) ; Exec. Order No. 10,925,
3 C.F.R. 448 (Supp. 1963).
106. 415 F.2d at 1275.
107. Executive orders merely constitute policy formulations by the president to
guide administrative agencies and do not create a private right of action. Blaze v. Moon,
345 F. Supp. 495, 496 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271,
1275 (8th Cir. 1969); Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
1967); Congress of Racial Equality v. Comm'r, 270 F. Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1967).
See generally Comment, Racial Discrimination in the Federal Civil Service, 38 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 265 (1969).

108. See Administrative Law Developments 207.
109. We could proceed to attempt to resolve the question whether agency inaction of the type complained of here is reviewable by federal courts and, if
the answer should be in the affirmative, to resolve the secondary question
whether on this record, with its conflicting testimony, the agency decision is
to remain undisturbed. Or we might assume a positive answer to the first
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Subsequent to the Gnotta decision, a district court case involving
1
similar facts was resolved in much the same fashion. In Blaze v. Moon, '
the plaintiff, a former employee of the Corps of Engineers, sought to
enjoin allegedly discriminatory employment, advancement and retention
practices within the agency. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
the nominal defendant, the District Engineer of the Galveston, Texas
District, had acted beyond his authority by not adhering to certain
statutes, executive orders and agency regulations prohibiting discriminatory practices."' The court, however, avoided discussion of the plaintiff's
allegation of ultra vires conduct and instead remarked that "[a] suit
against an officer of the United States is one against the United States
itself if the effect of the judgment would be to 'restrain the Government
from acting, or to compel it to act.' Accordingly, this must be treated as
a suit against the United States.""' The significance of this case is not its
eventual disposition, but rather the court's willingness to decide the case
upon sovereign immunity instead of reaching the merits.
Actual Statutory Authority
Most decisions involving the immunity doctrine are decided according to the general authority approach. Some decisions, however, reflect
a subtle move toward a more thorough examination of an officer's
statutory authority. Under one such approach, the court accepts the
plaintiff's factual allegations at face value for the purpose of determining
whether they will support a charge of ultra vires conduct. The court must
interpret the statute upon which the parties rely in order to discover
whether it permits the officer to commit the act in question. If authorization for the particular act is found in the statutory language, the suit
will then be barred by sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the suit
will be allowed to proceed where the court finds that the discretion
18
allowed under the statute did not include the right to commit the act.
question, without deciding it, and arrive at a positive answer to the second,
on the theory that personality conflict and a non-communicating coworker do
not of themselves equate the national origin discrimination, that the record at

best is conflicting, and that there is substantial evidence to support the agency
decision.
Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1969).
110.
111.

315 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
The plaintiff based his complaint, in part, on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (Supp. 1963) ; the fifth
amendment; and the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
112. 315 F. Supp. at 496 (citation omitted) quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).

113. Administrative Law Developments 212-14. See United Federation of Postal
Clerks v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902 (1969).
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This represents an improvement over the "general authority" approach
to the extent that it permits a meaningful inquiry into the merits of the
case.
This procedure was first articulated in West Coast Exploration Co.
v. McKay,"' where the plaintiff sought to require the Secretary of the
Interior to issue a patent to certain lands allegedly allotted to him under
the provisions of the Gerard Act."' The real question was whether the
Gerard Act applied to mineral lands. The court stated that where a party
asserts that a government officer is acting beyond his statutory powers,
the court, in deciding the preliminary jurisdictional question of whether
the United States is a necessary party, will accept the allegations at face
value for this limited purpose unless they are "so unsubstantial and
frivolous as to afford no basis for jurisdiction." ' The court also
declared that this approach was consistent with the Larson opinion.
After interpreting the statute, the court concluded that the Secretary had
acted properly.
More recently, several cases have utilized this approach in determining the applicability of sovereign immunity. Taylor v. Cohen"" concerned an attempt to restrain a local school board from adopting any
desegregation plan other than "freedom of choice" and to prohibit the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare from requiring the school
board to act in any other fashion. The plaintiff argued that HEW
officials, acting pursuant to provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,"1 8
had exceeded their statutory authority in declining to allow freedom of
choice. The court did not immediately dismiss the complaint, but rather,
discussed the statute in question and finally determined that it allowed sufficient discretion to permit the contested governmental action even though
the officials may have proceeded erroneously.
In Carter v. Seamans,"' an action brought by a discharged Air
Force officer seeking to invalidate his dismissal from service, the court
stated :
It should at once become evident that a determination of
the sovereign immunity issue requires a ruling on the ultimate
questions in the suit. In order to avoid deciding a case on the
merits under the guise of resolving preliminary jurisdictional
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

213 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
10 Stat. 849 (1855).
213 F.2d at 593.
405 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1968).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).

119. 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1971).
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issues, the courts have adopted the procedure of accepting at
face value, for jurisdictional purposes, the averments of the complaint unless they are so transparently insubstantial or frivolous
as to afford no possible basis for jurisdiction, and of giving the
averments thus accepted their natural jurisdictional consequences.12 °
Although the court determined that the defense of sovereign immunity
was not available to the Government, it dismissed the suit on the grounds
that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy in the Court of Claims for
damages.
These and similar cases may be viewed as a substantial qualification of Larson's dual procedure for determining jurisdiction and the
merits. This is not to say, however, that this necessarily represents a
return to the unitary standard of pre-Larson decisions under which
success on the motion to dismiss was equivalent to success on the merits.'
Explicit Statutory Authority
Another more radical approach is to require the statute upon which
the parties rely to contain rather explicit authorization for erroneous or
tortious conduct by the officers. This, of course, marks the greatest
departure from the general authority doctrine espoused by the majority ot
decisions since Larson. This approach was apparently used in Washington
v. Udall."2 In this case, Washington brought suit to secure review of a
decision by the Secretary of the Interior that the state was not entitled
to delivery of water from the Columbia Basin Project for more than
160 acres of irrigable, state-owned land. 2 ' The state argued that federal
officials had exceeded their authority in construing the phrase "land
held in private ownership" to apply to state school lands. The court
agreed that while administration of the Reclamation Act was within
the Secretary's general authority, the particular act might be ultra vires
if the statute did not permit him to make an erroneous decision:
[T]he mere allegation that a federal officer's action is erroneous, due to a mistake of fact or law, does not necessarily constitute a claim that he was acting beyond his delegated authority.
Nevertheless, if the State's interpretation of 43 U.S.C. §423e
is correct, the Secretary's imposition of a 160-acre limitation
120. Id. at 770.
121.

Administrative Law Developments 214.

122. 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969).
123. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970).
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does not appear to be within his delegated powers. The resolution of this issue depends on whether Congress granted to
the Secretary of the Interior, in his executing of contracts for
the delivery of irrigation water, the discretionary authority
to make incorrect as well as correct decisions concerning the
necessity for the inclusion of 160-acre limitations in the contracts.'
The court examined the statute and decided that, while discretion was
explicitly found in other parts of the legislation, the imposition of
acreage limitations was nondiscretionary.
This discretion-hunting formula appears to indicate that if nothing
in the statute is said about the officer's discretion, the court will assume
that it does not perimit the officer to make incorrect decisions. Where the
statute gives some discretion, but is silent on the right to make erroneous
decisions, at least one court has found such authority to be implied.
New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall". was a suit by state
officials to determine whether federal officials had the authority to kill
deer for research purposes within the boundaries of the Carlsbad Caverns
National Park without obtaining state permits. After analyzing the
powers of the Secretary of the Interior under the legislation in question,' 26 the court concluded that it conferred sufficient power upon the
officer to kill animals detrimental to the park. The issue in question was
actually the extent to which federal officials were bound by state statutes
in administering federal park lands. Perhaps, if the court had followed
the approach of the Washington case, 2 7 it would have concluded that the
officer's conduct was ultra vires. Instead, sovereign immunity barred
2
determination of an important federal-state question.
Each of these approaches to the ultra vires exception has found
proponents in the lower federal courts. The willingness of some courts to
adopt the "actual statutory authority" and the "explicit statutory
authority" positions in lieu of the more conventional "general statutory
authority" approach seemingly required by Larson indicates considerable judicial dissatisfaction with sovereign immunity and forecasts a less
prominent role for the doctrine in the future. This is an encouraging
sign in light of the doctrine's potential harmful effect in environmental
litigation.
124. 417 F.2d at 1316 (citations omitted).
125. 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 407a (1970).
127. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.

128. Administrative Law Developments 212.
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A SURVEY OF RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

Few environmental protection cases have specifically involved sovereign immunity, but an examination of these cases reveals some tendency
on the part of the courts to restrict the application of the doctrine.
Although it is sometimes difficult to justify these decisions with the
doctrinal requirements of Larson, it can be argued that they are in
accord with the broader policy of sovereign immunity. Whatever the
origins of the immunity doctrine, its sole justification today is to prevent
unnecessary and harmful judicial intereference with the orderly processes of government,' 29 and there is no place for sovereign immunity in
suits which do not conflict with this objective.
The great bulk of prior case law concerning sovereign immunity
involved the assertion of private rights against the government. Although
frequently couched in terms of constitutional or statutory protections,
the interests in question were either economic or translatable into
economic terms. Without disparaging the importance of such interests,
it can be seen that environmental interests differ significantly from these
traditional rights, and, arguably, they warrant different treatment.
Since private rights were generally of a pecuniary character, the plaintiff
could normally obtain compensation under the Tucker Act or in the Court
of Claims even though his suit for specific relief was barred by sovereign
immunity.' This also meant that the merits of his case would ultimately
be considered. This is not true of the environmental protection suit. One
who asserts an environmental interest generally represents the public and
has no private property interest to vindicate by an award of damages. 8'
Since he cannot sue for damages, no consideration of the merits of his
case will be made by any court if the suit is barred by sovereign immunity.
Consequently, administrative discretion on environmental matters could
be abused without challenge or penalty. This is particularly acute since
the environment is essentially irreplaceable. For these reasons, the apparent judicial hostility to sovereign immunity in the environmental
context seems justified.
One of the first cases considering sovereign immunity in an en129. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1946) ; Byse 1484.
130. Administrative Law Developments 203 n.185.
131. Environmental rights based on the ninth amendment to the Federal Constitution have been proposed by commentators, but have found little favor with the courts to
2
date. See generally Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E=MC : Enivironment Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 674
(1970) ; Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REv. 458

(1970).
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vironmental action applied the Larson criteria with little or no reference to
the environmental protection aspects. Delaware Valley Conservation Association v. Resor... was an action brought by a conservation association
to enjoin federal officials from proceeding with a recreation and reservoir
project. The district court's dismissal of the complaint on the basis of
sovereign immunity. 8 was upheld. The opinion concentrated on the
general test of whether a suit was one against the sovereign and only
briefly examined the officers' statutory authority in light of the scope of
authority rule. This was primarily because the plaintiffs had failed to
set forth any specific limitations on the officers' authority which would
have clearly prohibited the actions complained of. 8 ' This procedure was
in accord with the general authority approach of Larson.'8 5 Although the
court evinced concern for the project, it concluded that the plaintiffs'
suit was barred by sovereign immunity since neither the Delaware River
Basin Compac' 8 nor the Federal Power Act 8 . could be construed to
grant consent to suits of this type.
While the decision in Delaware Valley was proper in light of
Larson, it is subject to criticism on the ground that the merits of the case
were never reached. The district court noted that the plaintiffs' allegations were stated in "broad, conclusory and extremely general terms."' 88
Even so, the general nature of the allegations were detectable.'
In
essence, the plaintiffs were concerned with the effect on the environment
of certain power contracts that government officials were contemplating
in the future. 40
The "hands off" policy of the court in Delaware Valley does not
132.

133.
1967).
134.
135.
136.

392 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1968).

Delaware Valley Conservation Ass'n v. Resor, 269 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Pa.
392 F.2d at 335.
Id.
Delaware River Basin Compact § 15.1, 75 Stat. 688, 713 (1961).

137. Federal Power Act § 317, 16 U.S.C. § 825p (1970).
138. Delaware Valley Conservation Ass'n v. Resor, 269 F. Supp. 181, 183 (M.D.
Pa. 1967).
139. The refusal of the court to proceed without explicit directions from the plaintiff should be contrasted with the actions of the court in Izaak Walton League v. St.
Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970). See note 147 infra and accompanying text.
140. The gravammen of appellants' complaint as indicated in their brief is that
"defendants individually, in concert and through their agents and representatives are engaging in a series of unlawful and unconstitutional activities against
plaintiff, including, inter alia, arbitrarily and discriminatorily proceeding with
acquisition and condemnation of lands and waters and entering into illegal power
contracts for the reservoir project and recreation area without statutory authority and without satisfying the preconditions of the purported enabling act, in
violation of applicable law and without funds to pay just compensation."
Delaware Valley Conservation Ass'n v. Resor, 392 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 1968).
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seem in keeping with the tradition of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 4' where the court found a clear
congressional concern with environmental matters in the Federal Power
Act. Even if the plaintiffs' case in Delaware Valley was groundless, it
is unfortunate that the court never actually examined the nature of the
Government's authority to negotiate power contracts which might be
harmful to the environment. If the Federal Power Act placed limitations
on this discretion, then sovereign immunity should not have been applicaable.

1 42

Despite a somewhat unpromising beginning with Delaware Valley,
most of the recent environmental cases show a more critical attitude
toward the immunity doctrine. A few decisions, such as Parkerv. United
States, 8 have disposed of sovereign immunity by accepting allegations
of ultra vires conduct at face value for the purpose of determining
jurisdiction. Parker was an action to restrain the defendants from allowing the selling or cutting of timber in the East Meadow Creek area of the
White River National Forest in Colorado. The plaintiffs asserted that the
area was suitable for classification as "wilderness" under the 1964
Wilderness Act. and that failure to fully consider the recreational and
wilderness qualities of the area was contrary to the Multiple UseSustained Yield Act of 1960.'" In rejecting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the district court remarked that:
The Supreme Court has recognized that the applicability of
this doctrine [sovereign immunity] is not dependent upon
the denomination of the party defendant. In the present case
plaintiffs claim that the various named government officials
have acted outside of and in excess of any statutory authority
conferred upon them. Such a claim clearly takes this action
outside of the scope of sovereign immunity, for if the plaintiffs'
claim proves true, the actions of the defendants must be considered individual rather than sovereign acts. 4 '
Although the discussion of sovereign immunity in the Parker case
was brief, the court's resolution of the immunity question must be
regarded as significant.
In another case involving federal lands, a district court refused to
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
See, e.g., Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970).
307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969).
16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. (1970).
16 U.S.C. § 529 (1970).
307 F. Supp. at 687 (citation omitted).
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entertain a sovereign immunity defense in an action to enjoin federal
officers from allowing various persons to enter the Boundary Water
Canoe Area for the purpose of drilling, exploring or removing minerals.
The court in Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair' exhibited a clear
hostility toward sovereign immunity and declared that the plaintiff's
allegations of ultra vires conduct were sufficient to overcome the immunity defense:
Such allegations are in effect present here. While it is true
that plaintiff's complaint does not allege in haec verba that
defendants have done or are threatening to do an unlawful act,
by violating their management authority over the National
Forests or the BWCA but is directed for the most part to
defendants St. Clair and Yawkey, clearly it is pregnant with
the claim and assertion that granting permission to these latter
defendants is "inconsistent with the state and federal zoning
laws and the public policies of the United States and the State
of Minnesota which have been established to regulate mineral
development in the BWCA." This it seems to the court is a
sufficient allegation to bring this case which is one for injunctive
relief against the federal defendants within the first exception
above set forth [ultra vires acts] to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity."'

This language should be contrasted with the strict pleading requirements
imposed on the plaintiffs in the Delaware Valley case.1" 9 The court in
Izaak Walton not only accepted the plaintiff's allegations at face value,
but went to some lengths to discover them! It seems certain that a finding
of sovereign immunity could have been made under the general authority
approach of Larson. Instead, the court proceeded to the merits of the case
in addition to interpreting the footnote eleven limitations' on the type
of relief in a manner favorable to the plaintiff.
As in Parker, the court's treatment of the immunity question was
not extensive. Apparently, there was little consideration of whether the
legislation in question permitted erroneous decisions by federal officers.
147. 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
148. Id. at 1314.
149. See note 138 supra and accompanying text. The court also noted that sovereign
immunity was not raised as a defense in either Association of Data Processing Servicing
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), or Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970), despite the fact that one or more of the defendants in each case were federal
employees whose actions as government officials were under challenge. 313 F. Supp.
at 1315.
150. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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By implication it did not, since the defense of sovereign immunity was
rejected. Approving the plaintiff's assertions of ultra vires conduct, the
court indicated that it subscribed to the language used by Justice Douglas
in his dissent to Malone v. Bowdin,'' that "[s]overeign immunity has
become more and more out of date as the powers of the government and
its vast bureaucracy have increased."' 52
CONCLUSION

As environmental litigation continues to flourish, the various tests
of ultra vires conduct will continue to be applied in this new context
in order to avoid the immunity bar. Cases involving the National
Environmental Policy Act 5 will most likely indicate the relative strength
or weakness of the defense of sovereign immunity in the environmental
protection area.
Potentially, the National Environment Policy Act represents one
of the greatest threats to the continued existence of the immunity
doctrine in environmental litigation.'" The Act sets forth a congressional
manifestation of interest in and concern with protection of the environment. In addition to the declaration of a national policy concerning the
environment, the N.E.P.A. requires certain measures by governmental
agencies to protect natural resources.' 5 5 In particular, one provision of
the Act requires each agency to submit environmental impact statements." 6 The Act also sets forth certain procedures to be followed in
formulating such environmental impact statements. 5 7
At the present time it is impossible to predict how the courts will
view the National Environmental Policy Act and the obligations it
seemingly places upon officers of the government. Perhaps the courts
will interpret the Act so broadly as to characterize as ultra vires any
governmental action which appears to be at variance with the general
policies articulated by it. More likely, the courts will approach the Act
cautiously and examine only noncompliance with specific procedures or
requirements. Already it appears that the courts have taken a position
against retroactive enforcement of the N.E.P.A. 5

One case has already

151. 369 U.S. 643, 652 (1962) ; see notes 74-81 supra and accompanying text.
152. 313 F. Supp. at 1314 quoting with approval Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643,
652 (1962)

(dissenting opinion).

153. 83 Stat. 852 [hereinafter sometimes referred to as N.E.P.A. or the Act].
154. See Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970).
155. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 101-03, 83 Stat. 852.
156. Id.at § 102(c).
157. Id.
158. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
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arisen involving a failure to file any impact statement at all. In Environ1
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,
"" suit was brought to halt
construction of a dam across the Cossatot River. The district court
declared that while the Government itself was not bound by the outcome
of the suit, an injunction could be issued against the Secretary of the
Army and the Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers. The plaintiff had
alleged that the defendant's failure to file the required environmental
impact statement rendered any further work on the project ultra vires.
The court accepted these charges at face value and agreed that the defense of sovereign immunity was not available.
It remains to be seen whether failure to comply with the statutory
procedures for obtaining information in the formulation of an impact
statement can be characterized as ultra vires conduct. Another area of
future controversy is whether sovereign immunity would bar a private
challenge to the accuracy, completeness or content of such an impact
statement.
It seems clear that if the N.E.P.A. has vitality of its own and is not
simply used as a makeweight in environmental litigation, it will further
reduce the already declining influence of sovereign immunity in such
cases. With the advent of a new interest and awareness in environmental
matters both by the government and by private individuals, it is hoped
that such doctrines as sovereign immunity will not continue to vitiate,
the efforts of concerned persons to secure a review of dubious or harmful
governmental policies and operations.
1970); Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa.
1970).
159. 325 F. Supp. 728 (R.D. Ark. 1971).

